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Towards Bounded Synthesis of Resilient Supervisors Against
Actuator Attacks
Liyong Lin, Yuting Zhu, Rong Su
Abstract—In this work, we study the safety approach of
synthesizing resilient supervisors against actuator attacks, for
cyber-physical systems that can be modeled as discrete-event
systems. A constraint based approach for the bounded synthesis
of resilient supervisors is developed. The supervisor obfuscation
problem, which is proposed in a specific setting of actuator attack,
can be naturally modelled and solved using the same approach.
Index Terms – cyber-physical systems, discrete-event sys-
tems, supervisory control, constraints
I. INTRODUCTION
The safety of cyber-physical systems (CPS) against adver-
sarial attacks has recently drawn much research interest from
both the discrete-event systems and formal methods commu-
nity [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12].
For a recent survey and position paper on the discrete-event
systems based approach, the reader is referred to [13]. In this
paper, we consider discrete-event systems (DES) as our model
of CPS and consider an approach for the safety enforcement
of CPS under attacks. In particular, we further study the safety
approach of synthesizing resilient supervisors against actuator
attacks, mostly following the framework of [11], [12].
We assume there exists an adversarial attacker that can
corrupt a subset of events sent from the supervisor to the ac-
tuators (i.e., compromised controllable events). The attacker’s
goal is to cause damages on the attacked closed-loop systems.
Any supervisor that can guard against the damages caused by
attackers is said to be resilient. In this work, we shall address
the problem of resilient supervisor synthesis against actuator
enablement and disablement attacks. The main contributions
of this paper are as follows.
• We provide a generalized formulation of actuator attack.
Compared with [11], [12], we allow general control con-
straints on the supervisors and general attack constraints
on the attackers.
• We model each actuator attacker as a Moore automaton
and propose a new composition operator to construct
the attacked closed-loop system, for any given plant,
supervisor and actuator attacker.
• We generalize the supervisor obfuscation problem and
formulate the resilient supervisor synthesis problem with
a range-control target [14].
• We provide a constraint based approach for the bounded
synthesis of resilient supervisors against actuator attacks.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
the preliminaries. In Section III, we provide a very high-
level overview of the main idea behind our solution approach.
Section IV talks about the system setup and problem formu-
lation considered in this paper. In Section V, we provide the
constraint based approach for solving the bounded resilient
supervisor synthesis problem. Finally, conclusions and future
works are provided in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we shall introduce some basic notations and
terminologies used in automata theory [15], [16], [17] and
(quantified) Boolean formulas [18].
For any set A, we shall use |A| to denote its cardinality. For
any two sets A and B, we use A×B to denote their Cartesian
product and use A−B to denote their set difference.
A (partial) finite state automaton G over alphabet Σ is a
5-tuple (Q,Σ,δ ,q0,Qm), where Q is the finite set of states,
δ : Q×Σ −→ Q the partial transition function1, q0 ∈ Q the
initial state and Qm ⊆Q the set of marked states. G is said to
be a complete finite state automaton if δ is a total function. Let
L(G) and Lm(G) denote the closed-behavior and the marked-
behavior of G, respectively [15]. When Qm = Q, we also
write G = (Q,Σ,δ ,q0) for simplicity, in which case we have
Lm(G) = L(G). G is said to be n-bounded if |Q| ≤ n. For
any two finite state automata G1=(Q1,Σ1,δ1,q1,0,Q1,m),G2=
(Q2,Σ2,δ2,q2,0,Q2,m), we write G := G1‖G2 to denote their
synchronous product. Then, G = (Q := Q1 ×Q2,Σ := Σ1 ∪
Σ2,δ = δ1‖δ2,q0 := (q1,0,q2,0),Qm =Q1,m×Q2,m), where the
(partial) transition function δ is defined as follows: for any
q= (q1,q2) ∈Q and any
2 σ ∈ Σ,
δ (q,σ) :=


(δ1(q1,σ),q2), if σ ∈ Σ1\Σ2
(q1,δ2(q2,σ)), if σ ∈ Σ2\Σ1
(δ1(q1,σ),δ2(q2,σ)), if σ ∈ Σ1∩Σ2
A (partial) finite Moore automaton G is a 7-tuple
(Q,Σ,δ ,q0,Qm,T,η), where Q is the finite set of states, Σ the
input alphabet, δ :Q×Σ−→Q the (partial) transition function,
q0 ∈ Q the initial state, Qm ⊆ Q the subset of marked states,
T the output alphabet and η : Q −→ T the output function.
Whenever Q = Qm, we shall omit the Qm component. G is
said to be complete if δ is complete.
Propositional formulas (or, Boolean formulas) [18] are con-
structed from (Boolean) variables by using logical connectives
1As usual, we also view δ ⊆ Q×Σ×Q as a relation. We write δ (q,σ)! to
mean δ (q,σ) is defined.
2For example, if σ ∈ Σ1\Σ2 and δ1(q1,σ) is undefined, we treat δ (q,σ)
as undefined.
(∧,∨,⇒,¬). The truth value of a propositional formula φ is
determined by the variables’ truth values. A literal l is either
a variable xi or its negation ¬xi. A clause c is a disjunction
l1 ∨ . . .∨ ln of literals. A (propositional) formula in conjunc-
tive normal form (CNF) is a conjunction of clauses. Each
propositional formula can be transformed into an equivalent
formula in conjunctive normal form. Let Var(φ) denote the
set of all the variables that occurr in φ ; A model of φ
is a mapping M : Var(φ) → {0,1} (0 representing False, 1
representing True) such that φ is evaluated to be True if all
the variables xi in φ are substituted by M(xi). A propositional
formula φ is said to be satisfiable if it has a model M. The
Boolean Satisfiability Problem (abbreviated as SAT) is the
problem of determining if a given propositional formula is
satisfiable. Quantified Boolean formulas are an extension of
Boolean formulas where each variable can be quantified either
universally or existentially. The Quantified Boolean Formula
Problem (abbreviated as QBF) is the problem of determining
if a totally quantified Boolean formula is True or False.
III. MAIN IDEA
The problem of synthesis of resilient supervisors against
adversarial attacks can be formulated as an ∃∀ second order
synthesis problem. The main idea is explained as follows.
Let G denote the plant under control. In synthesizing resilient
supervisors, we essentially ask for the existence of a supervisor
S in the supervisor space S such that, for any attacker A
in the attacker space A , the attacked closed-loop system
◦(A,S,G) satisfies a desired safety property Φsa f e, if some
assumption Φassume holds, where ◦ is the composition operator
determined according to a chosen semantics of the attacker
and its effect on the closed-loop system. Then, the resilient
supervisor synthesis problem is reduced to a constructive proof
or refutation of the following ∃∀ second order logic formula:
∃S ∈S ,∀A ∈A , ◦(A,S,G) |= (Φassume ⇒Φsa f e),
Different variations of the resilient supervisor synthesis prob-
lem can be expressed, depending on the choice of supervisor
space, attacker space and properties Φassume and Φsa f e.
For the supervisor space, one can impose restrictions on the
set Σc of controllable events, the set Σo of observable events
and the state size of the supervisors, in addition to some prior
property that needs to be guaranteed by the supervisors on the
closed-loop systems (in the absence of attacker). For example,
one may be required to synthesize a resilient supervisor S of
state size3 no more than 106 that controls (at most) events a,b,
observes (at most) events a,c and ensures S‖G |=Φprior, where
Φprior denotes some prior safety (and progress) property that
needs to be satisfied by S‖G. By requiring L(S‖G) = K with
Φprior, the above synthesis formula can be used to model the
supervisor obfuscation problem [12].
For the attacker space, one can impose restrictions on
observation and attack capability of the attacker. For example,
the attacker space A may consist of all the actuator attackers
3The state size restriction may come from hardware memory limitation.
that are able to observe events a,b,c and attack event a. The at-
tacker may even combine sensor and actuator attacks [3], [11].
In general, it is also possible to consider distributed super-
visors (respectively, distributed attackers) over given control
architectures (respectively, attack architectures) as the super-
visor space (respectively, the attacker space).
Φsa f e can specify the state avoidance property (i.e., the
avoidance of certain states in the plant) or more general safety
property [11]. In [3] and [11], the attackers are assumed to
be covert. That is, the attacker needs to remain covert in
the course of attacking the closed-loop systems until damages
are inflicted upon the attacked closed-loop systems. Since the
covertness of an attacker is with respect to the supervisor and
plant, one can examine the covertness of an attacker by using
the attacked closed-loop system ◦(A,S,G). It is convenient to
express covertness by using Φassume (instead of defining it in
the attacker space), and we shall adopt this approach in this
paper. Thus, to synthesize a resilient supervisor against covert
attackers, we let Φassume = Φcovert . On the other hand, if we
let Φassume= True, then the covertness requirement is removed
and each synthesized resilient supervisor, if any, needs to guard
against the damages caused by risky attacks [11].
Instead of tackling the unbounded formulation directly, we
can start with a bounded formulation of the synthesis problem:
∃S ∈S n,∀A ∈A m, ◦(A,S,G) |= (Φassume ⇒Φsa f ety),
where S n denotes the space of supervisors of state sizes no
more than n and A m the space of attackers of state sizes
no more than m. To solve the bounded supervisor synthesis
problem, we focus on an approach that reduces the above ∃∀
second order synthesis problem to solving the QBF problem,
as carried out in [19], [20], [21] in a different context. The
basic idea proceeds as follows.
Since both S and A are of bounded state sizes, we can
encode each of them using a list of Boolean variables. Now, if
the (finite state) verification problem ◦(A,S,G) |= (Φassume ⇒
Φsa f ety) can also be propositionally encoded, e.g., using some
(quantified) Boolean formula φassumesa f e , then the above bounded
supervisor synthesis problem is effectively reduced to proving
the validity of the quantified Boolean formula ∃X ,∀Y,φassumesa f e ,
where X denotes a list of Boolean variables that encodes
supervisor S and Y encodes attacker A. We can then use a QBF
solver (or a repeated calls of SAT solver [20]), for example,
to solve ∃X ,∀Y,φassumesa f e and extract a certificate from its proof
that can be used to construct the supervisor S of state size no
more than n, if the formula is true. If the formula is false, then
we can increase the value of n and repeat the solving process.
If there exists a supervisor S of state size no more than n that
is resilient against all attackers of state sizes no more than
m, then there is still the trouble that S is not guaranteed to
be resilient against all the attackers. If4 there is available an
4Given any plant G and any supervisor S ∈ S , the oracle O correctly
synthesizes a successful attacker A ∈ A or asserts the non-existence of a
successful attacker (outputs ⊥). Often, such an oracle can be obtained, for
example, by using problem-specific constructions [3], [11]. An oracle may
also be developed by using a technique similar to that of [22].
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oracle O for solving the attacker synthesis problem
∃A ∈A , ◦(A,S,G) |= (Φassume ∧¬Φsa f e),
then we can check the resilience of S against all attackers. If
S is not resilient against all attackers, say there is a successful
attacker of size m′ > m, then we can solve the bounded
synthesis problem with supervisor space S n and attacker
space A m
′
. If indeed there is a resilient supervisor, then it
can be synthesized using the above procedure.
If there is no oracle O for solving the attacker synthesis
problem, then the best possibility for us is to synthesize a
supervisor that is resilient against all attackers up to a large
state size. It is possible that the synthesized supervisor is
indeed resilient, but there is no proof unless the oracle O
becomes available.
IV. SYSTEM SETUP AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Setup
To instantiate the idea in Section III, in the remaining of this
work, we focus on the problem of synthesis of resilient super-
visors against actuator attacks. To that end, we first introduce
and present a formalization of the system components.
Supervisor: A control constraint over Σ is a tuple C =
(Σc,Σo) of sub-alphabets of Σ, where Σo ⊆ Σ denotes the
subset of observable events and Σc ⊆ Σ denotes the subset
of controllable events. Let Σuo = Σ−Σo ⊆ Σ denote the subset
of unobservable events and let Σuc = Σ−Σc ⊆ Σ denote the
subset of uncontrollable events. In the absence of attacker,
a supervisor over control constraint (Σc,Σo) is modeled by
a finite state automaton S = (X ,Σ,ζ ,x0) that satisfies the
controllability and observability constraints [23]:
• (controllability) for any state x ∈ X and any uncontrol-
lable event σ ∈ Σuc, ζ (x,σ)!,
• (observability) for any state x ∈ X and any unobservable
event σ ∈ Σuo, ζ (x,σ)! implies ζ (x,σ) = x,
The control command generated at each supervisor state
x ∈ X is simply Γ(x) := {σ ∈ Σ | ζ (x,σ)!}. When and only
when the supervisor fires an observable transition ζ (x,σ) = x′
satisfying5 Γ(x) 6= Γ(x′), it sends the newly generated control
command Γ(x′) to the plant. In the degenerate case when the
system first initiates, the supervisor sends the initial control
command Γ(x0) to the plant.
Plant: The plant is modeled as a finite state automaton G=
(Q,Σ,δ ,q0) as usual. Whenever the plant fires an observable
transition δ (q,σ) = q′, it sends the observable event σ to the
supervisor.
Attacker: The attacker can exercise actuator attacks. We
assume the attacker knows the models of plant G and su-
pervisor S to allow the possibility of making informed attack
decisions6. We shall impose some restrictions on the capability
5In another setup [11], the supervisor sends a control command each time
when it fires an observable transition. The question of which setup to use
is implementation-dependant. In any case, it is straightforward to adapt the
solution.
6A supervisor that can guard against the damages caused by a knowledge-
able attacker can certainly guard against an “ignorant” attacker, if we do not
impose covertness assumption on the knowledgeable attacker.
of the attacker as follows. Let Σo,A ⊆ Σ denote the subset
of (plant) events that can be observed by the attacker. In
addition, we assume the attacker can fully observe each
control command sent from the supervisor to the plant. Let
Σc,A ⊆ Σc denote the subset of controllable events that can be
compromised under actuator attack. That is, the attacker can
modify the control command γ issued by the supervisor on
the subset Σc,A.
We shall henceforth refer to A = (Σo,A,Σc,A) as an attack
constraint. An attacker over attack constraint A is modeled
as a complete Moore automaton
A= (Y,Σa = (Σo,A×Γ)∪ (Σo,A×{ε})∪ ({ε}×Γ),β ,y0,T,η),
where β :Y×Σa −→Y is the transition function, T := {t ⊆ Σ |
t ⊆ Σc,A} is the output alphabet and η : Y −→ T is the output
function. Intuitively, Σa denotes the observation alphabet of the
attacker, each of which is a tuple that consists of 1) observation
of event execution from the plant and 2) control command
sent from the supervisor. Σa drives the state transition of the
attacker. The output function η assigns to each state y∈Y the
attack decisionη(y) ∈ T , specifying the actuator attack η(y).
Intuitively, the attacker determines at state y the set of enabled
compromised controllable events to be η(y). For each σ ∈ Σa,
we write σ = (σ [1],σ [2]).
Attacked Closed-loop System: In the presence of an
attacker, we assume the supervisor is augmented with a moni-
toring mechanism for the detection of attack. Recall that, in the
absence of attack, a supervisor is given as S=(X ,Σ,ζ ,x0) that
satisfies the controllability and observability constraints. Now,
let ST = (X ∪{xhalt},Σ,ζ
T ,x0) be the transformed supervisor,
where xhalt /∈ X is a distinguished halt state and ζ
T is obtained
from ζ by adding,
• for each state x∈X and each σ ∈Σc,A∩Σo, the transition
ζT (x,σ) = xhalt , if ¬ζ (x,σ)!,
• for each state x∈ X and each σ ∈Σc,A−Σo, the self-loop
transition ζT (x,σ) = x, if ¬ζ (x,σ).
The first item of the transformation is used for detecting the
presence of an attack. If an unexpected observable transi-
tion is observed by the supervisor, then the supervisor can
immediately infer the presence of an attacker and halts the
execution7 by running into the halt state xhalt , which has no
outgoing transition. The second item of the transformation
allows the occurrence of each compromised controllable event
that is unobservable to the supervisor, which leads to self loop.
Overall, both items ensure that each compromised controllable
event is treated as uncontrollable by the supervisor; accord-
ingly, each σ ∈ Σc,A is defined at each supervisor state of S
T
after the transformation. We here shall remark that control
commands are generated using S (and thus ζ ), which is the
supervisor under normal operation, instead of ST ; there are
two exceptional cases that are not modeled in S (due to attack
occurrence).
7In [8], when the supervisor detects the presence of an attack, all control-
lable events are disabled and uncontrollable events can still occur (immediate
halt by reset is impossible). This is not difficult to accommodate; we can add
self-loops at the halt state xhalt for each uncontrollable event σ ∈ Σuc.
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• At any supervisor state x∈ X and for any σ ∈ Σc,A−Σo,
if ¬ζ (x,σ)! and an enablement attack on σ occurs, we
shall assume Γ(ζ (x,σ)) = Γ(x), despite of the fact that
ζ (x,σ) is undefined. This is because the occurrence of
σ (due to attack) is unobservable to the supervisor.
• At any supervisor state x ∈ X and for any σ ∈ Σc,A∩Σo,
if ¬ζ (x,σ)! and an enablement attack on σ occurs,
we shall assume Γ(ζ (x,σ)) = Γ(x). Indeed, upon the
occurrence of an unexpected observable event σ (due
to attack), the supervisor has run into the halt state
and halted the execution of the closed-loop system. The
choice of Γ(ζ (x,σ)) does not matter and is chosen to
be Γ(x) in the definition for technical convenience.
Based on plant G, supervisor S (or transformed supervisor
ST ) and attacker A, we can construct the attacked closed-loop
system ◦(A,S,G). ◦(A,S,G) is a 4-tuple (Z,Σ,θ ,z0), where
Z = Y × (X ∪ {xhalt})×Q, z0 = (y0,x0,q0) ∈ Z is the initial
state and θ : Z×Σ −→ Z is the (partial) transition function.
The definition of θ is as follows: for any (y,x,q) ∈ Z and any
σ ∈ Σ,
1) if x 6= xhalt and [σ ∈ Σc,A∩C(y) or σ /∈ Σc,A∧ζ (x,σ)!],
a) if σ /∈ Σo,A ∧ (σ /∈ Σo ∨ Γ(x) = Γ(ζ (x,σ))), then
θ ((y,x,q),σ) = (y,ζT (x,σ),δ (q,σ))
b) if σ ∈ Σo,A ∧ (σ ∈ Σo ∧ Γ(x) 6=
Γ(ζ (x,σ))), then θ ((y,x,q),σ) =
(β (y,(σ ,Γ(ζ (x,σ)))),ζT (x,σ),δ (q,σ))
c) if σ ∈ Σo,A ∧ (σ /∈ Σo ∨ Γ(x) = Γ(ζ (x,σ))), then
θ ((y,x,q),σ) = (β (y,(σ ,ε)),ζT (x,σ),δ (q,σ))
d) if σ /∈ Σo,A ∧ (σ ∈ Σo ∧ Γ(x) 6=
Γ(ζ (x,σ))), then θ ((y,x,q),σ) =
(β (y,(ε,Γ(ζ (x,σ)))),ζT (x,σ),δ (q,σ))
2) θ is undefined for any other case
We shall provide an explanation about the definition of θ . We
only need to consider the case when x 6= xhalt , as otherwise
there will be no transition defined at (y,x,q) ∈ Z. If σ ∈ Σc,A,
then there is an outgoing transition at (y,x,q) labeled by σ only
if σ ∈C(y) , i.e., σ is enabled by the attacker at state y. If σ /∈
Σc,A, then there is an outgoing transition at (y,x,q) labeled by
σ only if ζ (x,σ)!, i.e., σ is enabled by the supervisor at state x
(in this case, we have ζT (x,σ) = ζ (x,σ)). The transition, due
to the execution of σ , for S and G shall be straightforward; the
transition for A depends on 1) its observation Po,A(σ) [11] on
σ and 2) the control command sent from the supervisor at state
ζ (x,σ), if any. There are four cases. The attacker observes σ ,
if σ ∈ Σo,A, and observes
8 ε , if σ /∈ Σo,A; the control command
Γ(ζ (x,σ)) is sent iff σ ∈ Σo∧Γ(x) 6= Γ(ζ (x,σ)).
Successful Attacker: To specify in a general manner what
strings can cause damages, in this work we use a complete fi-
nite state automaton H =(W,Σ,χ ,w0,Wm) [11] to facilitate the
expression of the property ¬Φsa f e (cf. Section III). Intuitively,
Φsa f e states
9 that “each string s ∈ Lm(H) cannot be generated
in the attacked closed-loop system” [11]. In the special case
8ε means nothing is observed.
9H is referred to as a damage automaton and each string s ∈ Lm(H) is said
to be a damage-inflicting string [11].
of state avoidance property, we can get rid of H and introduce
the set Qbad ⊆Q of bad states to avoid in the plant G. Without
loss of generality, we make the assumption that each w ∈Wm
is a sink state, i.e., ∀σ ∈ Σ,w ∈Wm,χ(w,σ) = w. Intuitively,
this means that damage is never recoverable. Furthermore, we
can assume |Wm|= 1, i.e., there is only one sink state, without
loss of generality. Let H = (W,Σ,χ ,w0,{wm}) in the rest.
To track the executions of the attacked closed-loop system
w.r.t. H, we synchronize ◦(A,S,G) with H using synchronous
product operation to obtain
O= ◦(A,S,G)‖H = (I,Σ,µ , i0, Im),
where I =Y × (X ∪{xhalt})×Q×W , i0 = (y0,x0,q0,w0), Im =
{(y,x,q,w) ∈ I | w = wm} and µ : I× Σ −→ I is the partial
transition function with µ = θ‖χ . To make it explicit, µ is
defined as follows: for any (y,x,q,w) ∈ I and for any σ ∈ Σ,
1) if x 6= xhalt and [σ ∈ Σc,A∩C(y) or σ /∈ Σc,A∧ζ (x,σ)!],
a) if σ /∈ Σo,A ∧ (σ /∈ Σo ∨ Γ(x) = Γ(ζ (x,σ))), then
µ((y,x,q,w),σ) = (y,ζT (x,σ),δ (q,σ),χ(w,σ))
b) if σ ∈ Σo,A ∧ (σ ∈ Σo ∧ Γ(x) 6=
Γ(ζ (x,σ))), then µ((y,x,q,w),σ) =
(β (y,(σ ,Γ(ζ (x,σ)))),ζT (x,σ),δ (q,σ),χ(w,σ))
c) if σ ∈ Σo,A ∧ (σ /∈ Σo ∨ Γ(x) =
Γ(ζ (x,σ))), then µ((y,x,q,w),σ) =
(β (y,(σ ,ε)),ζT (x,σ),δ (q,σ),χ(w,σ))
d) if σ /∈ Σo,A ∧ (σ ∈ Σo ∧ Γ(x) 6=
Γ(ζ (x,σ))), then µ((y,x,q,w),σ) =
(β (y,(ε,Γ(ζ (x,σ)))),ζT (x,σ),δ (q,σ),χ(w,σ))
2) µ is undefined for any other case
Then, Φsa f e is translated to “no state in Im is reachable from
i0”. Now, let us look at the assumption Φassume. For covertness
attack, intuitively Φassume =Φcovert requires that if the attacker
is ever caught, then it must have already caused damages.
Φassume is translated to “no state in {(y,xhalt ,q,w) | w 6= wm}
is reachable from i0”. Thus, a covert attacker’s goal is “no
state in {(y,xhalt ,q,w) |w 6=wm} is reachable from i0 and some
state in Im is reachable from i0”, i.e., Φassume∧¬Φsa f e; a risky
attacker’s goal is “some state in Im is reachable from i0”. An
attacker is successful if its goal is achieved.
B. Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we recall two problems, i.e., the supervi-
sor obfuscation problem [12] and a formulation of the resilient
supervisor synthesis problem [11].
1) Supervisor Obfuscation Given a plant G over Σ, a
supervisor S′, a control constraint C =(Σc,Σo), an attack
constraint A =(Σo,A,Σc,A), a damage automaton H over
Σ, compute a supervisor S over C , if it exists, such that
1) L(S′ ‖G)= L(S ‖G), 2) there is no successful attacker
on (G,S) w.r.t. A and H.
2) Resilient Supervisor Synthesis: Given a plant G over Σ,
a control constraint C = (Σc,Σo), specification automata
Gi = (Qi,Σ,δi,qi,0) over Σ (for i = 1,2) with L(G1) ⊆
L(G2), an attack constraint A = (Σo,A,Σc,A) and a dam-
age automaton H over Σ, compute a supervisor S w.r.t.
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C , if it exists, such that 1) L(G1) ⊆ L(S‖G) ⊆ L(G2)
and 2) there is no successful attacker on (G,S) w.r.t. A
and H?
Φprior (cf. Section III) for Problem 1 is L(S
′‖G) = L(S‖G)
and Φprior for Problem 2 is L(G1)⊆ L(S‖G)⊆ L(G2). Thus,
the supervisor obfuscation problem is a special case of the
resilient supervisor synthesis problem formulated above, by
setting L(G1) = L(G2) = L(S
′‖G). In the rest of this work, we
address the bounded resilient supervisor synthesis problem,
i.e., bounded formulation of Problem 2.
V. BOUNDED RESILIENT SUPERVISOR SYNTHESIS
Recall that the bounded resilient supervisor synthesis prob-
lem amounts to solving the ∃∀ second order logic formula:
∃S ∈S n, ∀A ∈A m, ◦(A,S,G) |= ¬Φassume∨Φsa f e,
for a large values of n and m. If there is an (respectively, no)
oracle for solving the attacker synthesis problem, then it is
possible to synthesize a resilient supervisor with (respectively,
without) proof (cf. Section III)
To solve the problem, we let Φassume = True. In this case,
a synthesized supervisor S, if it exists, is resilient against
all risky attackers of state sizes no more than m. A risky
attacker still uses the models of the plant, supervisor and its
online observations to make informed attack decisions; in the
ambiguous situation where an attack may cause damages or get
caught without causing damages, a risky attacker will carry out
the attack. Thus, a covert attacker is much conservative than
a risky attacker. Correspondingly, the synthesized supervisor
S is also resilient against all covert attackers of state sizes no
more than m. An advantage for using this heuristic is that, by
setting Φassume = True, we remove a lot of difficult constraints
associated with ¬Φassume. This may allow us to generate a
bounded resilient supervisor much faster.
We shall now generalize the technique of [24] and pro-
vide a polynomial-time reduction from the bounded resilient
supervisor synthesis problem with Φassume = True (bounded
formulation of Problem 2 for risky attackers) to the QSAT
problem. In the high level, the idea of the reduction proceeds
as follows: for any given bounded instance of Problem 2 with
plant G, damage automaton H, specification automata G1,G2,
control constraint C and attack constraint A , we produce a
QBF formula ΦG,H,G1 ,G2,C ,An,m such that Φ
G,H,G1,G2,C ,A
n,m is true
iff there exists an n-bounded supervisor S that is resilient
against all m-bounded risky attackers w.r.t. H and A and
L(G1)⊆ L(S‖G)⊆ L(G2). Moreover, we can extract a certifi-
cate from its proof that can be used to construct an n-bounded
supervisor S that is resilient against all risky attackers of state
sizes no more than m and satisfy Φprior, if the formula is true.
Let S= (X ,Σ,ζ ,x0) be an n-bounded finite state supervisor
over C = (Σc,Σo), where X := {x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1} consists of
n states, x0 ∈ X is the initial state; the partial transition
function ζ : X × Σ −→ X is the only parameter that needs
to be determined to ensure that S is a solution of the given
instance, if a solution exists. We need to use complete finite
state automata for tracking synchronous products. Thus, S
cannot be directly used. To properly model the halt state xhalt
for handling attack, it turns out that we need to work with
the tuple (ST ,{lx,σ | x ∈ X ,σ ∈ Σc,A ∩ Σuo}) instead, where
ST = (X ∪{xhalt},Σ,ζ
T ,x0) is the transformed supervisor, ST
denotes the completion of ST and each lx,σ is a Boolean
variable that is true iff there exists a loop at state x labeled
by σ in S (i.e., unobservable event σ is enabled at supervisor
state x). Formally, the completion of any partial finite state
automaton P= (U,Σ,pi ,u0) is a complete finite state automa-
ton P = (U ∪{ud},Σ,pi,u0,U), where the distinguished state
xd /∈U with d-subscript denotes the added dump state, pi =
pi ∪ ({ud}×Σ×{ud})∪{(u,σ ,ud) | pi(u,σ) is
undefined,u∈U,σ ∈ Σ}
We remark that it is straightforward to obtain ST and the
truth values of lx,σ from S; on the other hand, to obtain S
from ST , we need to remove all the transitions associated with
xhalt ,xd , and remove the self-loop labeled with σ ∈Σc,A∩Σuo if
the value of lx,σ is false, for each x∈X and each σ ∈Σc,A∩Σuo.
Thus, we only need to focus on (ST ,{lx,σ | x ∈ X ,σ ∈ Σc,A ∩
Σuo}).
We know that ST is given by the 5-tuple
({x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1,xhalt ,xd},Σ,ζT ,x0,{x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1,xhalt})
and we need to determine ζT to determine ST . We know
that ζT (xd ,σ) = xd and ζT (xhalt ,σ) = xd , for any σ ∈ Σ. For
convenience, we let xn = xhalt and xn+1 = xd . We introduce
Boolean variables tS
T
xi,σ ,x j
, where xi,x j ∈ X ∪ {xn,xn+1}, and
σ ∈ Σ, in the encoding of ST with the interpretation that
tS
T
xi,σ ,x j
is true if and only if ζT (xi,σ) = x j. We encode the
fact that ζT is a transition function using the following
constraints.
1) ¬tS
T
xi,σ ,x j
∨¬tS
T
xi ,σ ,xk
for each i ∈ [0,n−1], each σ ∈ Σ and
each j 6= k ∈ [0,n+ 1]
2)
∨
j∈[0,n+1] t
ST
xi,σ ,x j
for each i ∈ [0,n− 1] and each σ ∈ Σ
3) tS
T
xn,σ ,xn+1
for each σ ∈ Σ
4) tS
T
xn+1,σ ,xn+1
for each σ ∈ Σ
Then, let φ
ST , f sa
n denote the resultant formula after combin-
ing Constraints (1), (2), (3) and (4).
With the above constraints, we can now encode the fact
that S is a finite state supervisor over C = (Σc,Σo) and S
T is
a (properly) transformed supervisor using the following extra
constraints.
5)
∨
j∈[0,n−1] t
ST
xi,σ ,x j
for each i ∈ [0,n−1] and each σ ∈ Σuc
6) (
∨
j∈[0,n−1] t
ST
xi ,σ ,x j
) ⇒ tS
T
xi,σ ,xi
for each i ∈ [0,n− 1] and
each σ ∈ Σuo−Σc,A
7) tS
T
xi,σ ,xi
for each i ∈ [0,n− 1] and each σ ∈ Σc,A∩Σuo
8) ¬tS
T
xi,σ ,xn
, for each i ∈ [0,n− 1] and each σ /∈ Σc,A∩Σo
In particular, Constraints (5) are imposed to ensure control-
lability and Constraints (6) ensure observability of S. We
shall note that the range of the index j in (5) and (6)
does not contain n,n+ 1. Constraints (6) are only applied
for σ ∈ Σuo ∩ Σc,A. For each σ ∈ Σc,A ∩ Σuo, we know that
5
ζT (xi,σ) = xi in S
T for each i ∈ [0,n− 1]. This is captured
in Constraints (7). Constraints (8) intuitively mean that there
cannot be transitions labeled by σ /∈ Σc,A∩Σo from xi to xn, for
each i ∈ [0,n− 1]. Constraints (7) are (8) ensure that ST is a
(properly) transformed supervisor. Then, let φS
T ,con obs
n denote
the resultant formula after combining Constraints (5), (6), (7)
and (8).
Let φS
T
n = φ
ST , f sa
n ∧φ
ST ,con obs
n . The constraint φ
ST
n guaran-
tees that S is a n-bounded finite state supervisor over C . Now,
we need to introduce Boolean variables to encode the attacker
as well. Let
A= (Y,Σa = (Σo,A×Γ)∪ (Σo,A×{ε})∪ ({ε}×Γ),β ,y0,T,η),
be an m-bounded attacker over A = (Σo,A,Σc,A), where Y =
{y0,y1, . . . ,ym−1} consists of m states, y0 ∈ Y is the initial
state, T = {t ⊆ Σ | t ⊆ Σc,A} is the output alphabet; the partial
transition function β : Y ×Σa −→ Y and the output function
η :Y −→ T both need to be determined to specify the attacker
A. We introduce Boolean variables tAyi,σ ,y j , for each yi,y j ∈ Y ,
σ ∈ Σa, and introduce Boolean variables e
A
yi ,σ
, for each yi ∈Y ,
σ ∈ Σc,A. Intuitively, t
A
yi,σ ,y j
is true iff β (yi,σ) = y j and e
A
yi,σ
is true iff σ ∈ η(yi).
Now, we need to encode the fact that the attacker A is a
complete finite state automaton over Σa. This can be ensured
with the following constraints,
9) ¬tAyi ,σ ,y j ∨¬t
A
yi ,σ ,yk
, for each i ∈ [0,m− 1], each σ ∈ Σa
and each j 6= k ∈ [0,m− 1]
10)
∨
j∈[0,m−1] t
A
yi,σ ,y j
for each i ∈ [0,m−1] and each σ ∈ Σa
Let φattackm denote the formula that combines Constraints (9)
and (10).
Now, after the supervisor S and the attacker A has been
propositionally encoded, we need to encode propositionally
the following two constraints:
a) L(G1)⊆ L(S‖G)⊆ L(G2),
b) satisfaction of the safety property Φsa f e.
To encode L(G1) ⊆ L(S‖G)⊆ L(G2), we need to first obtain
the completion G1,G2,G of G1,G2,G, with added dump states
q1,d,q2,d ,qd respectively. We need to track the synchronous
product S‖G‖G1 to ensure that for any reachable state, if G1
is in the marked state, then S‖G has to be also in the marked
state. We also need to track the synchronous product S‖G‖G2
to ensure that for any reachable state, if S‖G is in the marked
state, then G2 has to be also in the marked state. Instead
of S, we shall work with ST to be consistent in formulating
constraints. Intuitively, both xn and xn+1 are now treated as
dump states in this case. We remark that it is now necessary to
use the Boolean variables lx,σ , where x∈ X and σ ∈ Σc,A∩Σuo,
instead of tS
T
x,σ ,x for tracking Σc,A∩Σuo loops in S. In fact, it is
possible that lx,σ is false but t
ST
x,σ ,x is always true due to attack
(cf. Constraint 7)).
For ST‖G‖G1, we now introduce
10, as in [24], auxiliary
Boolean variables rx,q.q1 , where x ∈ X ∪ {xn,xn+1}, q ∈ Q∪
10For technical convenience, we assume G,G1,G2 are all non-complete,
which is often the case in practice.
{qd} and q1 ∈ Q1 ∪ {q1,d}, with the interpretation that if
state (x,q,q1) is reachable from the initial state (x0,q0,q1,0)
in ST‖G‖G1, then rx,q,q1 is true. We have the following
constraints.
11) rx0,q0,q1,0
12) rxi,q,q1 ∧t
ST
xi ,σ ,x j
=⇒ rx j ,q′,q′1
, for each i, j ∈ [0,n+1], each
q,q′ ∈Q∪{qd}, each q1,q
′
1 ∈Q1∪{q1,d} and each σ /∈
Σc,A∩Σuo such that q
′ = δ (q,σ), q′1 = δ1(q1,σ)
13) rxi,q,q1 ∧ lxi ,σ =⇒ rxi ,q′,q′1
, for each i ∈ [0,n− 1], each
q,q′ ∈ Q ∪ {qd}, each q1,q
′
1 ∈ Q1 ∪ {q1,d} and each
σ ∈ Σc,A∩Σuo such that q
′ = δ (q,σ), q′1 = δ1(q1,σ)
14) rxi,q,q1 ∧t
ST
xi ,σ ,x j
=⇒ rx j ,q′,q′1
, for each i, j ∈ [n,n+1], each
q,q′ ∈Q∪{qd}, each q1,q
′
1 ∈Q1∪{q1,d} and each σ ∈
Σc,A∩Σuo such that q
′ = δ (q,σ), q′1 = δ1(q1,σ)
15)
∧
q∈Q∪{qd},i∈[0,n+1]
(¬rxn,q,q1 ∧¬rxn+1,q,q1 ∧¬rxi ,qd ,q1) for
each q1 ∈ Q1
In particular, Constraints (12), (13) and (14) are used to
propagate the constraints on rx,q,q1 , based on the synchronous
product construction and the inductive definition of reacha-
bility. We just need to note that special attention must be
paid to each σ ∈ Σc,A ∩ Σuo transition, and we need to use
lx,σ instead on each state x ∈ X = {x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1}. Based on
Constraints (12), (13) and (14), Constraints (15) are used to
ensure L(G1)⊆ L(S‖G). Let φ
ST
le f t denote the resultant formula
after combining Constraints (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15).
For ST‖G‖G2, similarly, we introduce auxiliary Boolean
variables rx,q.q2 , where x ∈ X ∪ {xn,xn+1}, q ∈ Q∪ {qd} and
q2 ∈ Q2∪{q2,d}, with the interpretation that if state (x,q,q2)
is reachable from the initial state (x0,q0,q2,0) in ST‖G‖G2,
then rx,q,q2 is true. We have the following constraints.
16) rx0,q0,q2,0
17) rxi,q,q2 ∧t
ST
xi ,σ ,x j
=⇒ rx j ,q′,q′2
, for each i, j ∈ [0,n+1], each
q,q′ ∈Q∪{qd}, each q2,q
′
2 ∈Q2∪{q2,d} and each σ /∈
Σc,A∩Σuo such that q
′ = δ (q,σ), q′2 = δ2(q2,σ)
18) rxi,q,q2 ∧ lxi ,σ =⇒ rxi ,q′,q′2
, for each i ∈ [0,n− 1], each
q,q′ ∈ Q ∪ {qd}, each q2,q
′
2 ∈ Q2 ∪ {q2,d} and each
σ ∈ Σc,A∩Σuo such that q
′ = δ (q,σ), q′2 = δ2(q2,σ)
19) rxi,q,q2 ∧t
ST
xi ,σ ,x j
=⇒ rx j ,q′,q′2
, for each i, j ∈ [n,n+1], each
q,q′ ∈Q∪{qd}, each q2,q
′
2 ∈Q2∪{q2,d} and each σ ∈
Σc,A∩Σuo such that q
′ = δ (q,σ), q′2 = δ2(q2,σ)
20) ¬rxi ,q,q2,d for each i ∈ [0,n− 1],q∈ Q
In particular, Constraints (17), (18) and (19) are used to
propagate the constraints on rx,q,q2 , based on the synchronous
product construction and the inductive definition of reacha-
bility. Based on Constraints (17), (18) and (19), Constraints
(20) are used to ensure L(S‖G)⊆ L(G2). Let φ
ST
right denote the
resultant formula after combining Constraints (16), (17), (18),
(19) and (20).
Finally, we need to encode the safety property Φsa f e, which
states that “no state in Im = {(y,x,q,w) ∈ I | w = wm} is
reachable from i0 in automaton O = ◦(A,S,G)‖H”. We need
to work with ST and G instead, in formulating the constraints.
We now introduce auxiliary Boolean variables ry,x.q,w, where
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y ∈ Y,x ∈ X ∪{xn,xn+1}, q ∈ Q∪{qd} and w ∈W , with the
interpretation that if state (y,x,q,w) is reachable from the
initial state (y0,x0,q0,w0) in ◦(A,ST ,G)‖H, then ry,x,q,w is true.
For each xi ∈ X , σ ∈ Σo∪ (Σ−Σc,A), we write
ω(xi,σ) :=
∨
j∈[0,n−1] t
ST
xi,σ ,x j
Intuitively, ω(xi,σ) is true iff ζ (xi,σ)!. In particular, we know
that tS
T
xi,σ ,x j
is a faithful11 encoding of the transition ζ (xi,σ) =
x j of S, for any σ ∈ Σo ∪ (Σ−Σc,A) and i, j ∈ [0,n− 1]. For
each σ ∈ Σc,A∩Σuo and each xi ∈X , we define ω(xi,σ) = lxi ,σ .
Again, ω(wi,σ) is true iff ζ (xi,σ)!.
For each xi ∈ X and each σ ∈ Σo, we define
φ(xi,σ) :=
∧
σ∈Σc(ω(xi,σ) ⇐⇒ ω(δ (xi,σ),σ)).
Intuitively, φ(xi,σ) is true iff Γ(xi) = Γ(xi,σ). We only need
to be concerned with the case when σ ∈ Σo, since no control
command will be sent when σ ∈ Σuo is fired. For any x ∈ X
and any control command γ ∈ Γ, we introduce the formula
ψ(x,γ) :=
∧
σ∈γ ω(x,σ)∧
∧
σ /∈γ ¬ω(x,σ). Intuitively, ψ(x,γ)
is true iff Γ(x) = γ . We have the following constraints, which
involve many case analysis.
21) ry0,x0,q0,w0
22) ryk ,xi,q,w ∧ t
ST
xi,σ ,x j
∧ eAyk,σ =⇒ ryk,x j ,q′,w′ , for each k ∈
[0,m− 1], each i, j ∈ [0,n+ 1], each q,q′ ∈ Q∪ {qd},
each w,w′ ∈W and each σ ∈ Σc,A−Σo,A−Σo such that
q′ = δ (q,σ), w′ = χ(w,σ)
23) ryk ,xi,q,w∧t
ST
xi ,σ ,x j
∧eAyk,σ ∧φ(xi,σ) =⇒ ryk,x j ,q′,w′ , for each
k ∈ [0,m−1], each i, j ∈ [1,n+1], each q,q′ ∈Q∪{qd},
each w,w′ ∈W and each σ ∈ (Σc,A−Σo,A)∩Σo such that
q′ = δ (q,σ), w′ = χ(w,σ)
24) ryk ,xi,q,w∧t
ST
xi ,σ ,x j
∧eAyk ,σ ∧ω(xi,σ) =⇒ ryk,x j ,q′,w′ , for each
k ∈ [0,m−1], each i, j ∈ [0,n+1], each q,q′ ∈Q∪{qd},
each w,w′ ∈W and each σ ∈ Σ−Σc,A−Σo,A−Σo such
that q′ = δ (q,σ), w′ = χ(w,σ)
25) ryk ,xi,q,w ∧ t
ST
xi,σ ,x j
∧ eAyk,σ ∧ ω(xi,σ) ∧ φ(xi,σ) =⇒
ryk ,x j ,q′,w′ , for each k ∈ [0,m− 1], each i, j ∈ [0,n+ 1],
each q,q′ ∈ Q ∪ {qd}, each w,w
′ ∈ W and each
σ ∈ (Σ − Σc,A − Σo,A) ∩ Σo such that q
′ = δ (q,σ),
w′ = χ(w,σ)
26) ryk ,xi,q,w ∧ t
ST
xi,σ ,x j
∧ tAyk ,σ ,yl ∧ e
A
yk ,σ
∧ ¬φ(xi,σ) ∧
ψ(x j,σ [2]) =⇒ ryl ,x j ,q′,w′ , for each k, l ∈ [0,m − 1],
each i, j ∈ [0,n + 1], each q,q′ ∈ Q ∪ {qd}, each
w,w′ ∈W , each σ ∈ Σc,A ∩Σo,A ∩Σo and each σ ∈ Σa
such that q′ = δ (q,σ), w′ = χ(w,σ), σ [1] = σ
27) ryk ,xi,q,w∧ t
ST
xi ,σ ,x j
∧ tAyk ,σ ,yl ∧ e
A
yk ,σ
∧ω(xi,σ)∧¬φ(xi ,σ)∧
ψ(x j,σ [2]) =⇒ ryl ,x j ,q′,w′ , for each k, l ∈ [0,m−1], each
i, j ∈ [0,n+ 1], each q,q′ ∈ Q∪ {qd}, each w,w
′ ∈W ,
each σ ∈ Σo,A ∩ Σo − Σc,A and each σ ∈ Σa such that
q′ = δ (q,σ), w′ = χ(w,σ), σ [1] = σ
28) ryk ,xi,q,w ∧ t
ST
xi,σ ,x j
∧ tA
yk,(σ ,ε),yl
∧ eAyk,σ =⇒ ryl ,x j ,q′,w′ , for
each k ∈ [0,m− 1], each i, j ∈ [0,n+ 1], each q,q′ ∈
11That is, tS
T
xi ,σ ,x j
is true iff ζ (xi,σ) = x j , for any σ ∈ Σo ∪ (Σ−Σc,A) and
i, j ∈ [0,n−1].
Q∪{qd}, each w,w
′ ∈W and each σ ∈ Σc,A∩Σo,A−Σo
such that q′ = δ (q,σ), w′ = χ(w,σ)
29) ryk,xi ,q,w ∧ t
ST
xi ,σ ,x j
∧ tA
yk ,(σ ,ε),yl
∧ eAyk,σ ∧ φ(xi,σ) =⇒
ryl ,x j ,q′,w′ , for each k ∈ [0,m− 1], each i, j ∈ [1,n+ 1],
each q,q′ ∈ Q ∪ {qd}, each w,w
′ ∈ W and each
σ ∈ Σc,A∩Σo,A∩Σo such that q
′ = δ (q,σ), w′ = χ(w,σ)
30) ryk,xi ,q,w ∧ t
ST
xi,σ ,x j
∧ tA
yk,(σ ,ε),yl
∧ eAyk,σ ∧ ω(xi,σ) =⇒
ryl ,x j ,q′,w′ , for each k ∈ [0,m− 1], each i, j ∈ [0,n+ 1],
each q,q′ ∈ Q ∪ {qd}, each w,w
′ ∈ W and each
σ ∈ Σo,A−Σc,A−Σo such that q
′= δ (q,σ), w′ = χ(w,σ)
31) ryk,xi ,q,w ∧ t
ST
xi,σ ,x j
∧ tA
yk,(σ ,ε),yl
∧ eAyk,σ ∧ ω(xi,σ) ∧
φ(xi,σ) =⇒ ryl ,x j ,q′,w′ , for each k ∈ [0,m− 1], each
i, j ∈ [0,n+1], each q,q′ ∈Q∪{qd}, each w,w
′ ∈W and
each σ ∈ (Σ−Σc,A)∩Σo,A∩Σo such that q
′ = δ (q,σ),
w′ = χ(w,σ)
32) ryk,xi ,q,w ∧ t
ST
xi ,σ ,x j
∧ tAyk ,σ ,yl ∧ e
A
yk,σ
∧ ¬φ(xi,σ) ∧
ψ(x j,σ [2]) =⇒ ryl ,x j ,q′,w′ , for each k, l ∈ [0,m − 1],
each i, j ∈ [0,n + 1], each q,q′ ∈ Q ∪ {qd}, each
w,w′ ∈ W , each σ ∈ Σc,A ∩ (Σ− Σo,A) ∩ Σo and each
σ ∈ Σa such that q
′ = δ (q,σ), w′ = χ(w,σ), σ [1] = ε
33) ryk,xi ,q,w∧ t
ST
xi ,σ ,x j
∧ tAyk ,σ ,yl ∧ e
A
yk ,σ
∧ω(xi,σ)∧¬φ(xi ,σ)∧
ψ(x j,σ [2]) =⇒ ryl ,x j ,q′,w′ , for each k, l ∈ [0,m−1], each
i, j ∈ [0,n+ 1], each q,q′ ∈ Q∪ {qd}, each w,w
′ ∈W ,
each σΣo−Σc,A−Σo,A and each σ ∈ Σa such that q
′ =
δ (q,σ), w′ = χ(w,σ), σ [1] = ε
34)
∧
j∈[1,m],q∈Q,i∈[0,n]¬ry j ,xi ,q,wm
In particular, Constraints (22) are used for the case
σ ∈ Σc,A∩C(yk) and σ /∈ Σo,A∧σ /∈ Σo
Constraints (23) are used for the case
σ ∈ Σc,A∩C(yk) and σ /∈ Σo,A∧Γ(xi) = Γ(ζ (xi,σ))
Constraints (24) are used for the case
σ /∈ Σc,A∧ζ (xi,σ)! and σ /∈ Σo,A∧σ /∈ Σo
Constraints (25) are used for the case
σ /∈ Σc,A∧ζ (xi,σ)! and σ /∈ Σo,A∧Γ(xi) = Γ(ζ (xi,σ))
Constraints (22), (23), (24) and (25) all belong to the case 1.
a) of the definition of automaton O= ◦(A,S,G)‖H.
Constraints (26) are used for the case
σ ∈ Σc,A∩C(yk) and
σ ∈ Σo,A∧ (σ ∈ Σo∧Γ(xi) 6= Γ(ζ (xi,σ)))
Constraints (27) are used for the case
σ /∈ Σc,A∧ζ (xi,σ)! and
σ ∈ Σo,A∧ (σ ∈ Σo∧Γ(xi) 6= Γ(ζ (xi,σ)))
Constraints (26) and (27) all belong to the case 1. b) of the
definition of automaton O= ◦(A,S,G)‖H.
Constraints (28)-(33) deal with the rest two cases 1. c) and
1. d) in the definition of automaton O= ◦(A,S,G)‖H, which
are exactly dual to Constraints (22)-(27) (replacing σ ∈ Σc,A
with σ /∈ Σc,A and vice versa).
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Constraints (22)-(33) are used to propagate the constraints
on ry,x,q,w, based on the construction of ◦(A,ST ,G)‖H and
the inductive definition of reachability. Based on Constraints
(22)-(33) Constraints (34) are used to ensure “no state in Im is
reachable from i0 in automaton O= ◦(A,S,G)‖H, i.e., Φsa f e.
Let φS
T
,G,H,A
sa f e denote the formula combining the Constraints
(22)-(34). Let X :=
{tS
T
xi,σ ,x j
| i, j ∈ [0,n+ 1],σ ∈ Σ}∪{lxi,σ | i ∈ [0,n− 1],σ ∈
Σc,A∩Σuo}
denote the list of Boolean variables that encodes the supervisor
S and let Y :=
{tAyi,σ ,y j | i, j ∈ [0,m− 1],σ ∈ Σa}∪{e
A
yi,σ
| i ∈ [0,m− 1],σ ∈
Σc,A}
denote the list of Boolean variables that encodes the encode
the attacker A. Let
Rle f t = {rxi,q,q1 | i ∈ [0,n+ 1],q∈ Q∪{qd},q1 ∈Q1∪{q1,d}}
denote the auxiliary Boolean variables for φS
T
le f t ; let
Rright = {rxi,q,q2 | i ∈ [0,n+ 1],q∈Q∪{qd},q2 ∈ Q2∪{q2,d}}
denote the auxiliary Boolean variables for φS
T
right ; let
Rsa f e := {ry j ,xi,q,w | j∈ [0,m−1], i∈ [0,n+1],q∈Q∪{qd},w∈W}
denote the auxiliary Boolean variables for formula φ
ST ,G,H,A
sa f e .
Then, the bounded resilient supervisor synthesis problem
associated with Problem 2, for Φassume = True, is reduced to
the validity of the following QBF formula φ resilientn,m :=
∃X ,(φS
T
n ∧ (∃R
le f t ,φS
T
le f t )∧ (∃R
right ,φS
T
right)∧ (∀Y,(φ
attack
m ⇒
(∃Rsa f e,φS
T ,G,H,A
sa f e ))))
If φ resilientn,m is true, we can extract a certificate from its proof
and obtain the assignments of Boolean variables in X , which
can be used to construct a resilient n-bounded supervisor S
against all attackers of state sizes no more than m (both
cover and non-covert attackers) and satisfy L(G1)⊆ L(S‖G)⊆
L(G2), as we have discussed before (first construct ST , then
construct S). In the case of restricting to normal supervisors
(i.e., Σc ⊆ Σo) and normal attackers (i.e., Σc,A ⊆ Σo,A) with
the additional restriction that Σo,A ⊆ Σo [11], we can run the
oracle O in [11] for attacker synthesis problem for verifying
the resilience of a supervisor against all covert attackers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper presents a preliminary study on the problem
of synthesizing bounded resilient supervisors against actuator
attacks, including both enablement and disablement attacks.
There are many research works that can be carried out to
extend this work. An immediate problem of interest is the
attacker synthesis problem for a general setup, where an oracle
is planned to be developed. The symbolic encoding technique
used in this work can be improved and we plan to extend
the bounded synthesis supervisor approach to attack scenarios
with both actuator and sensor attacks.
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